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FOREWORD 
Sharply reduced rates of population and industrial growth 
have been projected for many of the developed nations in the 
1980s. In economies that rely primarily on market mechanisms 
to redirect capital and labor from surplus to deficit areas, 
the problems of adjustment may be slow and socially costly. In 
the more centralized economies, increasing difficulties in 
determining investment allocations and inducing sectoral redis- 
tributions of a nearly constant or diminishing labor force may 
arise. The socioeconomic problems that flow from such changes 
in labor demands and supplies form the contextual background 
of the Manpower Analysis Task, which is striving to develop 
methods for analyzing and projecting the impacts of interna- 
tional, national, and regional population dynamics on labor 
supply, demand, and productivity in the more-developed nations. 
This paper, written by a member of IIASA1s Young Scientist 
Summer Program of 1980, focuses on an alternative explanation 
of the concave age profile of the path of a worker's lifetime 
earnings. The author argues that such concave earnings streams 
can be generated by a model that focuses on demand behavior 
independent of supply considerations. He then discusses the 
identification problem that results. 
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ABSTRACT 
Estimation of individual and social rates of return is 
typically done using the labor supply model of human capital 
theory. Traditionally, concave age-earnings profiles are found. 
This paper points out that employer hiring practices, instituted 
because of imperfect information of worker productivity, will 
generate concave earnings profiles. The implied identification 
problem for empirical estimation is discussed. 
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EARNINGS GROWTH WITHOUT 
INVESTMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
Income usually increases over a worker's life. It follows 
a concave path: rising quickly at the beginning but increasing 
at a successively slower rate as the worker ages. To explain 
this fact human capital theory suggests that workers choose to 
forgo current consumption to pay for training that will yield a 
higher income in the future. Empirical work appears to have 
confirmed that this type of optimization is widespread in the 
labor force (see references cited in Blaug 1976, and Mincer 1970). 
The maintained hypothesis in this empirical work is that observed 
earnings streams can be explained using what is essentially a 
model of individual labor supply. 
However most workers are constrained in their choice over 
types of employment. Unless a worker is self-employed, he must 
accept that not just the level of training, but his training with 
respect to all other workers is important in determining his job. 
Personal characteristics other than training will also affect 
one's job offers. If education acts as a screening device, there 
may not be an "optimal" investment for a job. To the extent that 
workers are rank ordered (according to any criterion) and fit into 
preexisting job slots there may not even be stability of return to 
a given level of investment. 
This paper will discuss how demand and supply behavior 
interact to determine employee earnings streams. The demand 
model used was developed in Arthur (1979). It will be shown 
that with few assumptions on Arthur's model, and none on 
individual behavior, reduced-form empirical results of concave 
earnings streams can be expected. This implies that empirically 
there is an identification problem, with both supply and demand 
explanations for why income has its observed growth path over 
time. Econometric studies that interpret their results solely 
with a supply story may well be misleading. 
The human capital and signaling theories of investment and 
income determination are discussed briefly in Section.1. 
Sections 2 and 3 outline the model and present comparative 
statics results for different labor market situations. Section 
4 goes back to the human capital literature to see how this 
model fits in with previous work. 
1. INCOME GROWTH IN A DEMAND CONSTRAINED LABOR MARKET 
Human capital theory suggests that workers plan for the 
future by investing in training while young that will give them 
a higher income in the future. The exact time sequence of 
training and earnings is determined by individuals' discount 
rates (Becker 1964; Mincer 1974; Rosen 1972). A concave growth 
path of income arises because the present value of the return 
on additional training decreases as the worker ages. 
Very special assumptions on labor demand are necessary to 
make market behavior consistent with the human capital supply 
model and therefore permit rate of return estimation. Calcula- 
tion of social returns requires perfect (costless) information 
about an employee's productivity so that he may be correctly 
compensated for his investment in training. Calculation of 
individual returns requires that wage rates for skilled jobs 
remain stable and predictable regardless of possible excess 
supply in any job category. It is argued below that these 
conditions will not in general obtain. 
In a highly specialized economy the majority of jobs are 
dictated by the needs of existing companies. A worker does not 
create a position. Instead he chooses for which of the avail- 
able jobs he will compete. To match the labor force with the 
existing jobs requires that employers set up a rank-ordering 
system to help them make hiring decisions. There may be many 
applicants who would perform satisfactorily in a given position, 
or there may be none. 
A possible inefficiency in this matching process is already 
apparent. If workers' desired employment is constrained because 
of a limited demand by employers of those with a particular 
skill, then some workers will have been "over-trained" for the 
job they are forced to take. 
This type of inefficiency is even encouraged by the hiring 
system (Arrow 1973). In practice training costs cannot be 
measured exactly before hiring a worker but must be imputed 
through variables believed to be correlated with worker quality. 
Imperfect knowledge of a worker's ability before he is hired 
will increase the probability of bad matches. To minimize the 
uncertainty over finding desirable employment,workers will tend 
to "over-invest" in education or develop other personal charac- 
teristics that make them more attractive to employers. Invest- 
ment as an (imperfectly used) quality signal rather than as a 
measure of productive ability explains why private and social 
rates of return to education may differ. This is discussed in 
depth in Spence (1973, 1974).* 
The notion of a social return to education is further 
blurred by the fact that the marginal product of a worker may in 
fact be unknown to either the employer or employee. In the 
production sector few products are the output of an individual 
worker but rather of an assembly line where each worker is 
essential but whose marginal product is not the entire output. . 
*Another interpretation of the labor queue is a ranking according 
to training costs given in Thurow (1974). To the extent that 
most employment training is done on the job and employers must 
pay some of the costs, workers can be ranked by desirability in 
inverse order of their training costs. 
P o l i c e  a r e  n o t  p a i d  f o r  t h e  cr imes they  p r e v e n t ,  no r  a r e  
p o l i t i c i a n s  p a i d  f o r  l e a d e r s h i p  given.  The va lue  o f  t h e  o u t p u t  
from many wh i t e  c o l l a r  and b u r e a u c r a t i c  jobs  i s  n o t  e a s i l y  
c a l c u l a b l e .  * 
The e x i s t e n c e  of s i g n a l i n g  does  n o t  p r ec lude  a  s t a b l e  h i r i n g  
p roces s  t h a t  might  g e n e r a t e  s t a b l e  i n d i v i d u a l  r e t u r n s  t o  educa- 
t i o n .  But t h e r e  i s  enough v a r i a t i o n  i n  t h e  economy's employment 
s t r u c t u r e  t o  make t h e  p r e d i c t i o n  e r r o r  f o r  i n d i v i d u a l  r e t u r n  
c a l c u l a t i o n s  t o o  l a r g e .  Changes i n  bo th  t h e  s k i l l - l e v e l  r e q u i r e -  
ments f o r  evo lv ing  technology and t h e  average  q u a l i t y  o f  t h e  
l a b o r  f o r c e  must be p r e d i c t a b l e  s o  t h e  rank-order ing  w i t h  r e s p e c t  
t o  t r a i n i n g  w i l l  b e  s t a b l e .  I n t e r a c t i o n  between s i g n a l s  w i l l  
r ende r  a  ve ry  low p r e d i c t a b i l i t y  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  any one s i g n a l .  
The r e t u r n  t o  a  c o l l e g e  educa t ion  f o r  an  i n n e r - c i t y  youth  and a 
son of  a  s u c c e s s f u l  businessman w i l l  be  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  d i f f e r e n t .  
The r e l a t i v e  v a l u e s  f o r  t h e i r  educa t ions  w i l l  change a s  h i r i n g  
p r a c t i c e s  change,  e .g . ,  a f f i r m a t i v e  a c t i o n  programs. 
With u n c e r t a i n t y  about  how much t o  i n v e s t  i n  t r a i n i n g  f o r  
an  undetermined job w i t h  unknown p r o d u c t i v i t y  (wage), a  worker 
w i l l  be s u b j e c t  t o  t r a d i t i o n  and convenience i n  h i s  h i r i n g  and 
promotion. Ne i the r  i n d i v i d u a l  r e t u r n s  no r  s o c i e t a l  r e t u r n s  t o  
educa t ion  can be  (numer ica l ly )  c a l c u l a t e d  w i t h  s i g n i f i c a n t  
conf idence.    ode ling i n d i v i d u a l  behav ior  i s  n o t  enough when 
jobs  and even t h e  t i m e  sequence o f  income i n  a  job a r e  imposed 
by t h e  employer. The o b j e c t  of  t h e  n e x t  s e c t i o n  i s  t o  p r e s e n t  
one approach t o  modeling t h e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  demand f o r  l a b o r  
w i t h i n  which i n d i v i d u a l  d e c i s i o n s  a r e  made. 
2.  THE MODEL 
Thi s  s e c t i o n  w i l l  d i s c u s s  an i n s t i t u t i o n a l  demand model of  
t h e  l a b o r  market .  The a n a l y t i c s  and e x p o s i t i o n  c l o s e l y  fo l l ow  
Ar thur  (1979).  Thurow (1974) p r e s e n t s  a  s i m i l a r  model of  t h e  
*The s o c i a l  u s e f u l n e s s  o f  many government bu reauc rac i e s ,  even i f  
t h e y  do t h e i r  job i s  ano the r  ques t i on .  
l a b o r  market  based  on job-compet i t ion  r a t h e r  t h a n  wage competi-  
t i o n .  The A r t h u r  model w i l l  be  used t o  d e r i v e  s i m p l e  compara- 
t i v e  s t a t i c s  r e s u l t s  t h a t  s u g g e s t  demand b e h a v i o r ,  i n d e p e n d e n t  
of  s u p p l y  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ,  w i l l  g i v e  r ise  t o  concave e a r n i n g s  
s t r e a m s  . 
I n  t h i s  model j o b s  a r e  o r g a n i z e d  i n t o  a h i e r a r c h y . *  Workers 
e n t e r  t h e  l a b o r  market  and a r e  a s s i g n e d  an  i n i t i a l  p o s i t i o n  r e l a -  
t i v e  t o  o t h e r  workers  based on p e r s o n a l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .  Employers 
e x h i b i t  a  p r e f e r e n c e  a c r o s s  p e r s o n a l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  and age  t h a t  
d e t e r m i n e s  what  job  a worker w i l l  g e t  and how q u i c k l y  h e  w i l l  
advance. A worker  i s  promoted n o t  because  of  i n c r e a s e d  produc- 
t i v i t y ,  b u t  because  t h e  number o f  workers  p r e f e r r e d  t o  him dimin- 
i s h e s  due  t o  d e a t h s  and r e t i r e m e n t . * *  H i s  e a r n i n g s  stream i s  
determined by t h e  wage rates  a s s i g n e d  t o  t h e  s e n i o r i t y  l e v e l s  h e  
p a s s e s  th rough  from e n t r a n c e  t o  e x i t  from t h e  l a b o r  f o r c e .  An 
i n d i v i d u a l  may a f f e c t  t h e  job  f o r  which h e  i s  s e l e c t e d  by chang ing  
t h e  s i g n a l s  t h a t  employers  see, b u t  t h e  job  s t r u c t u r e  remains  t h e  
same. To t h e  f u n c t i o n i n g  of  t h e  sys tem it makes no d i f f e r e n c e  
which i n d i v i d u a l  i s  s e l e c t e d  f o r  a  g i v e n  job.  I t  w i l l  b e  assumed 
t h a t  a l l  j o b s  are open t o  anyone w i t h  t h e  r i g h t  combina t ions  o f  
a b i l i t y  o r  a g e ,  and t h a t  a l l  v a c a n c i e s  a r e  f i l l e d  immedia te ly .  
For s i m p l i c i t y  t h e  number o f  jobs  w i l l  be  assumed t o  be  exogenously  
de termined o u t s i d e  of  t h e  l a b o r  market .  
Pour  f u n c t i o n s  w i l l  b e  set up t o  e x p l a i n  t h e  w o r k e r ' s  
e a r n i n g s  s t r e a m s :  A job  s e n i o r i t y  h i e r a r c h y ,  i t s  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  
wage f u n c t i o n ,  a  l a b o r  f o r c e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  f u n c t i o n  o v e r  p e r s o n a l  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  and t i m e ,  and a  p r e f e r e n c e  o r d e r i n g  t h a t  d e t e r -  
mines how workers  s h o u l d  be  promoted. Each f u n c t i o n  w i l l  
i n i t i a l l y  be s p e c i f i e d  independen t ly .  P o s s i b l e  l i n k s  between 
t h e s e  f u n c t i o n s  w i l l  be e x p l o r e d  l a t e r  i n  t h e  s e c t i o n .  
*The h i e r a r c h i c a l  job  s t r u c t u r e  i s  t a k e n  as given .  P o s s i b l e  
m o t i v a t i o n  f o r  t h i s  t y p e  o f  s t r u c t u r e  i s  d i s c u s s e d  i n  S t i g l i t z  
(1975) and Lazear  and Rosen (1979) .  
**Keyf i t2  (1973) l o o k s  a t  an i n s t i t u t i o n a l  job  h i e r a r c h y  where 
promotion i s  de te rmined  by t h e  r a t i o  of  p e r c e n t  above t o  p e r c e n t  
below i n  t h e  h i e r a r c h y .  H e  a l s o  obse rved  concave s e n i o r i t y  
p r o f i l e s .  
2 . 1  J o b  Hierarchy 
A t  any t i m e  t ,  t h e r e  a r e  m ( a , t )  jobs  a t  s e n i o r i t y  l e v e l  a .  
The s e n i o r i t y  i ndex  a  i s  o r d i n a l ,  and f o r  convenience  w i l l  be  
normal ized o v e r  t h e  i n t e r v a l  ( 0 , l ) .  The sum o f  a l l  jobs  above 
l e v e l  ct i n  t h e  economy i s  
Most h i e r a r c h i a l  s t r u c t u r e s  have fewer peop le  i n  t h e  more s e n i o r  
p o s i t i o n s ,  s u g g e s t i n g  Ma < 0 ,  M c r , > O ,  where t h e  s u b s c r i p t s  r ep re -  
s e n t  t h e  f i r s t  and second d e r i v a t i v e s  w i th  r e s p e c t  t o  a. I t  can 
b e  expec ted  t h a t  t h e  job  supp ly  w i l l  grow o v e r  t i m e  a t  a  r a t e  
s i m i l a r  t o  t h e  growth i n  popu la t i on  ( e x p o n e n t i a l )  implying 
Mt 0 ,  Mtt > 0. 
2 . 2  Wage D i s t r i b u t i o n  
Assoc i a t ed  w i t h  each s e n i o r i t y  l e v e l  a t  any p o i n t  i n  t i m e  
i s  a  wage r a t e ,  w = w ( a , t ) .  Th i s  f u n c t i o n  r e f l e c t s  t h e  employer ' s  
d e c i s i o n  on how t o  d i v i d e  t h e  agg rega t e  o u t p u t  between workers.  
Both f i r s t  d e r i v a t i v e s  w i l l  most l i k e l y  be  p o s i t i v e .  With t h e  
wage r a t e  assumed t o  be  a  monotonic f u n c t i o n  o f  s e n i o r i t y ,  t h e  
wage f u n c t i o n  w i l l  n o t  be  d i s c u s s e d ,  a n d ' s e n i o r i t y  w i l l  be  
i n t e r p r e t e d  a s  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  t h e  e a r n i n g s  l e v e l .  
2 . 3  Labor Force  Dens i ty  Func t ion  
There a r e  L ( x , t , y )  number o f  workers o f  age  x  a t  t i m e  t i n  
t h e  l a b o r  f o r c e ,  d i s t r i b u t e d  a c r o s s  " a b i l i t y "  y. The v e c t o r  y  
r e p r e s e n t s  a l l  non-age f a c t o r s  which might  be  used a s  s e l e c t i o n  
c r i t e r i a  by a  p o t e n t i a l  employer. These c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  might ,  
f o r  example, be s choo l ing ,  knowing t h e  r i g h t  peop le ,  o r  r a c e .  
It i s  assumed t h a t  each of  t h e s e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  i s  q u a n t i f i a b l e  
s o  t h a t  it can b e  ranked  a long  an a x i s .  Any assumpt ions  made on 
d e r i v a t i v e s  w i th  r e s p e c t  t o  y  w i l l  be  assumed t o  ho ld  f o r  each 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c .  For  i l l u s t r a t i v e  purposes  I w i l l  t r e a t  y  a s  a  
s i n g l e  a b i l i t y  a x i s .  With a  c o n s t a n t  o r  growing p o p u l a t i o n  Lt'O. 
Geometric o r  e x p o n e n t i a l  growth i m p l i e s  L  > 0. tt 
2 . 4  Promotion System 
A p r e f e r e n c e  o r d e r i n g  i n  a b i l i t y - a g e  s p a c e  d e c i d e s  which of  
two c a n d i t a t e s  i s  p r e f e r r e d  f o r  a  p a r t i c u l a r  job.  A s  i l l u s t r a t e d  
i n  F i g u r e  1 ,  i n  each  y e a r  new e n t r a n t s  d i s t r i b u t e d  ? c r o s s  t h e  
a b i l i t y  a x i s  e n t e r  t h e  labor f o r c e .  A s  t h e y  a g e ,  and t h o s e  above 
them r e t i r e  o r  d i e ,  t h e  promot ion  sys tem d e t e r m i n e s  t h e i r  r a t e  of  
advancement w i t h i n  t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e .  Both A and B i n  
F i g u r e  1 a r e  t h e  same age:  b u t  pe r son  A crosses p r e f e r e n c e  c u r v e s  
more q u i c k l y  t h a n  B and soon e n d s  up more p r e f e r r e d .  I n  a d d i t i o n  
t o  t h e  b a s i c  a s sumpt ions  of  r e f l e x i v i t y ,  c o m p l e t e n e s s ,  and t r a n s -  
s i v i t y ,  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  o b s e r v a t i o n s  a b o u t  employer  p r e f e r e n c e s  
j u s t i f y  t h e  u s e  o f  convex p r e f e r e n c e  curves :*  
P ~ s t u l a t e  I :  G r e a t e r  a b i l i t y  i s  p r e f e r r e d  t o  l e s s e r  a b i l i t y  
I f  a b i l i t y  i s  d e f i n e d  as b e i n g  any c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  d e s i r e d  by 
t h e  b u r e a u c r a t i c  h i r i n g  o f f i c e ,  t h i s  j u s t  s a y s  t h a t  h i r i n g  
p r a c t i c e s  are r a t i o n a l .  
P o s t x l a t e  2 :  G r e a t e r  age  i s  p r e f e r r e d  t o  l e s s e r  age 
Long t e r m  employment i s  e s s e n t i a l  t o  t h e  c r e a t i o n  and 
m a i n t a i n a n c e  of a bureaucracy .  I t  i s  a l s o  t h o u g h t  t o  be 
good b u s i n e s s  s e n s e  t o  have o l d e r  r a t h e r  t h a n  younger 
managers.  Age and p e r s o n a l  m a t u r i t y  a r e  e x p l i c i t l y  
rewarded.** 
*A concave advancement mapping i n  a b i l i t y - a g e  s p a c e  may b e  
obse rved  i n  t h e  manpower p l a n n i n g  l i t e r a t u r e ,  see Plougonven 
(1978) .  
**Doer inger  and P i o r e  (1971) found a g e  ( independen t  o f  p r o d u c t i v i t y )  
t o  be  one r e a s o n  f o r  promotion i n  t h e  f i r m s  t h e y  i n t e r v i e w e d .  
Minimum a g e  l i m i t s  " t o  i n s u r e  t h a t  t h e  a p p l i c a n t s  have t h e  matur-  
i t y  n e c e s s a r y  f o r  s u c c e s s f u l  job  performance" a r e  e x p l i c i t l y  
c o n s i d e r e d  by t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s  o f  Government i n  h i r i n g  (U.S. 
C i v i l  S e r v i c e  Commission 1978, p . 6 ) .  The Japanese  (nenk5) sys tem 
of  advancement is a l s o  p a r t l y  based  on s e n i o r i t y  ( ~ a l e n s o n  and 
Odaka 1976, 2 .609) .  
Ability 
Figure 1. Advancement of two workers of the same age 
but with different abilities. 
PostuZate 3: Diminishing returns 
While age is valued, as a worker gets older he is rewarded 
with proportionally less of an increase in "preference". 
A person's maturity increases (proportionately) more when 
he is young than when he is old. Concavity of preference 
in age is also necessary for the promotion system to be 
consistent with a concave hierarchial system. Likewise 
substantive quality differences between workers are not 
recognized by the bureaucracy which merely ranks workers 
with respect to one another. 
The preference function can be represented by a=h(x,y), 
where y and x are ability and age, and a is a (cardinal) index 
of preference. While preference itself is ordinal, to represent 
the preference curves in Figure 1 a cardinal index that changes 
with each preference locus must be created. The preference 
function may evolve over time. That possibility is discussecl_ 
in Section 3. 
It is straightforward to interpret the restrictions 
Postulates 1-3 have placed on the function a=h(x,y). Postulates 
1 and 2 imply that seniority is increasing in x and y so that 
3a aa 
and - are positive. There exists a trade-off between ability 
ox ay 
and age so - is negative. Diminishing returns to ability and 
ax -, 
aLa age at a given level of preferment implies that - < 0 and 
2 3 a 
ay2 
-
7 < 0. 
3. MODEL APPLICATIONS 
To illustrate how this system works the derivatives of the 
seniority function will be computed analytically. The simplest 
case, where each function is exogenously determined and the 
labor force distribution is static [L = L (x,y) ] , gives the most 
straightforward analytic results and will be dealt with first. 
Some of the restrictive assumptions will then be relaxed in 
order to examine what the model implies about specific types of 
labor market behavior.* 
3.1 The Static Case 
Figure 2 illustrates how to calculate the number of people 
preferred to person A. One first finds the implicit index a* of 
the indifference curve determined by A's ability (T), and age 
- - ( x ) ,  such that a* = h(x,y). The formula for the curve is 
a* = h (x,y) . The area above a* = h (x,y) , (the upper contour) 
specified by $(a*), will be called the "regionof preferment" to 
A. Integrating over the preferred area gives the formula 
*Most of these examples are discussed in less detail in Arthur 
(1979). 
Ability 
Figure  2.  Est imat ion  of t h e  r eg ion  of  preferment  f o r  a  
worker w i th  age x and a b i l i t y  y .  
where N A ( t )  i s  t h e  number of a l l  persons  p r e f e r r e d  t o  A. M(aA,t)  
people  w i l l  be employed a t  h ighe r  s e n i o r i t y  jobs i n  t h e  h i e r a rchy .  
I t  i s  asswed t h a t  a l l  vacanc ies  a r e  f i l l e d  immediately. There- 
f o r e  t h e  fo l lowing  i d e n t i t y  
w i l l  hold a t  each p o i n t  i n  t ime.  This  i d e n t i t y  can be so lved  
i m p l i c i t l y  f o r  s e n i o r i t y  a  a s  a  func t ion  of t i m e ,  given t h e  
f u n c t i o n a l  forms and t h e  p e r s o n ' s  a b i l i t y  l e v e l  7.  The wage 
func t ion  w i l l  map s e n i o r i t y  i n t o  earn ings .  
Look f i r s t  a t  t h e  s e r l i o r i t y  f u n c t i o n  M ( a ,  t)  , break ing  i t  up 
f o r  convenience i n t o  t h e  produc t  of two s i n g l e  argument f u n c t i o n s  
R(a)  and S ( t ) ,  such  t h a t  
From t h e  arguments above it i s  expec ted  R < 0,  R~~ z 0 ,  st z 0 ,  a 
Stt < 0. Assuming t h e  i n v e r s e  f u n c t i o n  R-l e x i s t s  
where t h e  c a p i t a l  l e t t e r s  r e p r e s e n t  e n t i r e  f u n c t i o n s .  The r a t e  
o f  change of  s e n i o r i t y  is unambiguously p o s i t i v e  f o r  N t  < 0. I n  
t h e  c a s e  where St i s  less t han  ze ro ,  where t h e  number o f  jobs  
d e c r e a s e s  ove r  t i m e ,  s e n i o r i t y  may d e c r e a s e  and t h e  comparat ive  
s t a t i c s  a r e  r i g h t l y  ambiguous. The second d e r i v a t i v e  
w i l l  be unambiguously less than  ze ro ,  implying a concave s e n i o r i t y  
l o c u s  ove r  t i m e ,  i f  bo th  N t  < 0 and N t t  > 0. I t  i s  s t i l l  p o s s i b l e  
f o r  s e n i o r i t y  advancement t o  be concave i f  Ntt  < 0 ,  b u t  t h e n  t h e  
r e l a t i v e  magnitudes o f  t h e  two terms i n  e q u a t i o n  ( 3 )  become 
impor tan t .  
I t  is  now neces sa ry  t o  conf i rm t h a t  i n  f a c t  Nt < 0 and 
Ntt 0. Note t h a t  even i f  t h e  l a b o r  f o r c e  does  n o t  change ove r  
t i m e ,  t h e  number o f  peop le  p r e f e r r e d  t o  A remains a f u n c t i o n  o f  
t ime because  $ ( a * )  i s  a f u n c t i o n  o f  b o t h  a b i l i t y  and t i m e  ( t h e  
worke r ' s  a g e ) .  So lv ing  t h e  i n t e g r a l  i n  e q u a t i o n  (1 ) ( t h e  age  
of  t h e  worker,  X r  i s  f i x e d )  * 
*To make t h e  a n a l y t i c s  more t r a c t a b l e  it w i l l  be assumed a = h ( x , y )  
can be w r i t t e n  y = f ( a , x ) .  Also,  i n  t h e  above exp re s s ion  2 i s  t h e  
lowes t  age  o f  anybody more p r e f e r r e d  t o  a ,  such t h a t  a = h ( $ , l ) .  
Here t h e  maximum a b i l i t y  and age have been normalized t o  one. 
Using L e i b n i t z ' s  r u l e  f o r  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  i n s i d e  an i n t e g r a l ,  
A 
There i s  only  one term because f ( a , x )  = 1 .  P o s t u l a t e s  1 and 2 
- 
a f  presume t h a t  both a b i l i t y  and age a r e  p r e f e r r e d ,  implying - and 
aa 
aa 
- a r e  p o s i t i v e .  The d e r i v a t i v e  i n  ( 4 )  i s  nega t ive  because a l l  a t  
arguments i n  t h e  i n t e g r a l  a r e  nonnegative. Diminishing r e t u r n s  
t o  advancement wi th  r e s p e c t  t o  both a b i l i t y  and age,  imply t h a t  
2 2 
- a and 
2 a a a r e  nega t ive .  Therefore  t h e  second d e r i v a t i v e  over  ?a 2 
N ( t )  with  r e s p e c t  t o  t ime 
i s  p o s i t i v e .  The few assumptions made so  f a r  a r e  enough t o  
guarantee concave s e n i o r i t y  advancement.* Note t h a t  d iminish ing  
I .3 \ 
r e t u r n s  wi th  r e s p e c t  t o  age 1s s u f f i c i e n t  bu t  n o t  (3 < 0) - 
necessary f o r  concave advancement. I f  - a a were g r e a t e r  than  ze ro  
a t 2  
t h e  r e s u l t  would depend on t h e  r e l a t i v e  magnitudes of. t h e  two 
terms i n  equat ion  ( 5 ) .  
*The mapping of s e n i o r i t y  i n t o  earn ings  has  rece ived  l i t t l e  
a t t e n t i o n .  A p o s i t i v e  f i r s t  d e r i v a t i v e  of w ( a , t )  wi th  r e s p e c t  
t o  a i s  e a s i l y  pos i t ed .  However t h e  concavi ty  of t h e  second 
d2w depends on - d e r i v a t i v e  7 a 2a a s  w e l l  a s  -2 . - measures d t  aa 't2 aa 2 
t h e  convexi ty  o f  t h e  r a t e  of s a l a r y  advance f o r  i n c r e a s i n g  
s e n i o r i t y  and could  very w e l l  be p o s i t i v e .  Then t h e  convexity 
of  t h e  wage func t ion  r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e  concavi ty  of  t h e  advance- 
ment func t ion  determines  t h e  shape of  t h e  ea rn ings  stream. 
This  ques t ion  would have t o  be s e t t l e d  empi r i ca l ly .  
3 . 2  Labor Force  Growth 
When t h e  l a b o r  f o r c e  i s  pe rmi t t ed  t o  change o v e r  t ime ,  such 
t h a t  L = L ( x , t , y ) ,  t h e  s i g n  of  Nt becomes i nde t e rmina t e .  The f i r s t  
d e r i v a t i v e  
i s  now t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  of two p o s i t i v e  t e r m s .  The t e r m  from equa- 
t i o n  ( 4 )  keeps  t h e  same d e n s i t y  b u t  pe rmi t s  t h e  r e g i o n  o f  p re -  
ferment  t o  s h r i n k ,  wh i l e  t h e  a d d i t i o n a l  t e r m  r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  r a t e  
of i n c r e a s e  i n  worker d e n s i t y  f o r  a  f i x e d  r e g i o n  o f  p re fe rment .  
For sma l l  l a b o r  f o r c e  i n c r e a s e s  i t  can be  expec t ed  t h a t  a l l  
c u r r e n t  workers w i l l  advance w i t h i n  t h e  h i e r a r c h y .  Workers w i th  
h igh  a b i l i t y  w i l l  be  d i s p l a c e d  less t han  low a b i l i t y  workers ,  
because  bo th  t h e i r  r e g i o n  of  p re fe rment  i s  s ~ a l l e r  [ I  - f ( a , x ) ]  
2 2 a  
and t h e i r  r a t e  o f  advancement i s  g r e a t e r ,  -
a t a y  > 0. I f  t h e r e  i s  
a  l a r g e  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  l a b o r  f o r c e  unaccompanied by job  c r e a t i o n  
a l l  workers  below some a b i l i t y  l e v e l  w i l l  f i n d  t hey  a r e  redundant .  
Th i s  would happen i f  t h e  f i r s t  t e r m  i n  equa t i on  ( 6 )  dominated t h e  
a N  
second caus ing  - > 0 below some l e v e l  E .  Thi s  model o f  employ- a t  - 
ment t h a t  r anks  everyone and t h e n  l e a v e s  t h e  l e a s t - s k i l l e d - l o w e s t -  
a b i l i t y  peop le  unemployed i s  c o n s i s t e n t  w i th  t h e  l a r g e  amount o f  
" s t r u c t u r a l  unemployment" now observed i n  t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s .  
With t h e  f i r s t  d e r i v a t i v e  o f  N ( t )  of i n d e t e r m i n a t e  s i g n ,  t h e  
second d e r i v a t i v e  a l s o  l o s e s  i t s  unambiguous p o s i t i v e  s i q n .  Two 
more terms appear  w i t h i n  t h e  i n t e g r a l  i n  equa t i on  (7) compared t o  
e q u a t i o n  ( 5 )  
Both a d d i t i o n a l  terms a r e  p o s i t i v e .  The f i r s t  term i s  t h e  
d e r i v a t i v e  o f  popula t ion  i n c r e a s e  i n t e g r a t e d  over  t h e  r eg ion  of 
preferment .  I t  i n c r e a s e s  t h e  concavi ty  of  t h e  s e n i o r i t y  func t ion .  
2 
a i s  l i k e l y  t o  be However, s i n c e  popu la t ion  i n c r e a s e s  s lowly,  - 
a t 2  
smal l .  Consequently t h e  f i r s t  term may be swamped by t h e  second, 
which i s  t h e  combined e f f e c t  of an inc reased  l a b o r  f o r c e  and 
2 
a i s  i n d e t e r -  decreased r eg ion  of preferment .  The n e t  e f f e c t  on - 
minate. a t 2  
3 . 3  Baby Boom 
The e f f e c t  of a  sudden i n c r e a s e  o r  dec rease  i n  l a b o r  f o r c e  
growth can be analyzed w i t h  t h i s  model. Ar thur  (1979)  has gone 
through t h e  a n a l y t i c s .  I w i l l  n o t  reproduce them h e r e  b u t  merely 
e x p l a i n  t h e  imp l i ca t ions .*  
Advancement w i t h i n  t h e  h i e r a r c h y  i s  determined s o l e l y  by t h e  
number of  people  p r e f e r r e d .  Both t h e  age and a b i l i t y  of t h o s e  i n  
t h e  l a b o r  f o r c e  bu lge  r e l a t i v e  t o  o n e ' s  own are impor tan t .  These 
determine how much t h e  change i n  t h e  l a b o r  f o r c e  d e n s i t y  w i l l  
e f f e c t  o n e ' s  r eg ion  of preferment .  High a b i l i t y  people  o l d e r  than  
t h e  l a r g e  cohor t  w i l l  be on ly  s l i g h t l y  a f f e c t e d ,  a s  o n l y  t h e  most 
a b l e  younger workers w i l l  be a b l e  t o  l eap f rog  over  them t o  h ighe r  
s e n i o r i t y  p o s i t i o n s .  Low a b i l i t y  people bo th  i n  t h e  bu lge  and 
behind it w i l l  be e s p e c i a l l y  hard  h i t .  They w i l l  advance s lowly  
and i n  p e r i o d s  of  economic downturns, s u f f e r  s p e l l s  o f  unemployment. 
3 . 4  Supply Response t o  Wage Rates  
So f a r  t h e  f o u r  d i s t r i b u t i o n  f u n c t i o n s  t h a t  make up t h i s  
model--senior i ty ,  wage, l a b o r  f o r c e ,  and promotion--have been 
assumed t o  be independent of  one another .  However, a l a b o r  f o r c e  
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  response  t o  changes i n  t h e  wage r a t e  i s  e m p i r i c a l l y  
observed,  such t h a t  t h e  l a b o r  f o r c e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  f u n c t i o n  might be 
*Cornford ( 1 9 8 0 )  has used t h i s  model t o  e m p i r i c a l l y  s tudy  t h e  
e f f e c t s  o f  t h e  Baby Boom on c a r e e r  advancement i n  t h e  American 
academic l a b o r  f o r c e .  
specified as * 
The net effect to equation (6) of specifying ~(x,t,w) as in 
equation (8) is to add another term inside the integral that is 
the responsiveness of the X(x,w,y) function to wage changes over 
a h  being either positive (income time. A case can be made for 
effect) or negative (secondary worker effect!. It is crucial 
that the X function include y as an argument. Labor force fluc- 
tuations are important to an individual's career only if they 
affect the numbers of workers preferred to him. Therefore only 
the supply response of workers with higher ability or slightly 
lower ability but greater age is important. Cyclical participa- 
tion of "discouragsd workers" who are most probably low in the 
job ranking will not affect many workers. 
3.5 Both Competitive and Institutional Markets 
Not all jobs in the economy fit into an institutional 
framework of the type presented here. It is more accurate to 
recognize that only some professions, e.g., government and cor- 
porate bureaucracies, can be well described by an institutional 
system. Salaries for other jobs, such as piecework-production 
jobs or the self-employed, are determined in more competitive 
markets where productivity is mea-sureable and duely rewarded. 
One can ask what the implications are of assuming the coexistence 
of these two types of job markets. 
The expected utility of an identical worker starting in 
each system should be equal, but expected earnings might not be. 
A decision to sell labor in either market will depend on risk 
aversion (the institutional job will provide greater certainty of 
employment), individual rate of time preference (the intertemporal 
stream of earnings offered by institutional employment may not 
*For a study of ability (schooling) responsiveness to wage rates 
see Dresch (1975) and Freeman (1975). 
coincide with the worker's preference), and the degree of mobility 
between the two sectors (where a worker from the competitive 
sector would be placed in the seniority ladder). Little can be 
said mathematically without committing oneself to a specific 
distribution of individual utility across ability levels. 
3.6 Generalizations 
Other specific cases could be discussed but as they get more 
complex the comparative statics become even less determined. 
The four separate functions that have been specified are in 
some sense arbitrary. Including linkages between them would be 
more realistic. In this simple system the labor force distribu- 
tion function models labor supply, while the preference ordering 
and seniority function determine labor demand. The demand func- 
tions cannot be completely independent but must' maintain some 
consistency between the hierarchical structure and the rate of 
promotion. The labor force distribution and promotion functions 
are the only two that depend on the way ability is measured, 
therefore they cannot be specified independently. 
The purpose of the comparative statics excercises was to 
illustrate the behavior of this model, and to show that for weak 
but realistic assumptions on the basic wage determination rela- 
tions concave earnings functions are implied. No assumptions 
about individual income maximizing behavior are necessary. 
4. COMPATABILITY OF THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND MODELS OF WAGE 
DETERMINATION . 
The individual behavior suggested by the human capital and 
signaling models j.s consistent with this institutional explanation 
of how workers are matched with jobs. But, it is argued, the 
inefficiencies that form the basis for the institutional model 
render precise estimates of rates of return impossible. 
Both the signaling and institutional models allow for social 
inefficiencies through the possible imperfect correspondence 
between the "employer observed relationship between productivity 
and signalsn and the "true relationship". However the signaling 
model proposes a feedback mechanism that will iterate to a 
(possibly non-optimal) equilibrium: employees invest in signals 
to be used as hiring criteria by employers; and employers in 
turn evaluate the signals they receive from prospective employees 
on the basis of their experience in the labor market. This is 
illustrated in Figure 3. 
In the institutional model there is no tendency to move 
towards an equilibrium where institutional preferences are 
consistent with marginal product because marginal product is not 
relevant, The origins of the promotion system may lie in exactly 
the type of institutionalization process Spence describes. But 
as jobs change it is impossible to keep track of individual 
productivity and the preference system loses its foundation in 
rational determination. The box in the lower left of the diagram 
is only imperfectly determined. For modeling purposes, the work- 
ings of the promotion system must be posited, A rather loose 
attempt from observing the market is presented in Section 2. 
I employer observed I I individual signaling 1 
I relationship between h- - - - -1  decisions, return I I I I 
I productivity and signals I I I maximizing I I I I I 
employers' conditional 
beliefs about productivity 
I signaling costs I 
L - -  - - - - - 1  
Figure 3. Signaling feedback mechanism. (Source: Spence 1973, 
p.359, or 1974, p.17.) 
* 
wage 
function 
The i n s t i t u t i o n a l  model can i n c o r p o r a t e  i n d i v i d u a l  p lanned 
inves tment  i n  human c a p i t a l .  Even w i t h  a  b u r e a u c r a t i c  h i r i n g  
p r o c e s s  a  pe rson  may obse rve  t h a t  d i f f e r e n t  e a r n i n g s  p a t h s  a r e  
a v a i l a b l e  f o r  workers  w i t h  d i f f e r e n t  s i g n a l s  and choose  t o  i n v e s t  
i n  school ing .  However i n d i v i d u a l  supply  d e c i s i o n s  p l a y  no r o l e  
i n  t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  d e c i s i o n s  ove r  what jobs  t o  o f f e r  workers .  
S i n c e  any one  worker i s ' d i r e c t l y  competing w i t h  o t h e r s  w i t h i n  a  
rank-ordered sys tem f o r  predetermined jobs ,  t h e  job he  f i n a l l y  
ends  up i n ,  and consequen t ly  t h e  r e t u r n  t o  h i s  e d u c a t i o n ,  depends 
on t h e  s i g n a l s  o f  everyone else i n  t h e  l a b o r  f o r c e .  
There i s  a l s o  no r ea son  t o  e x p e c t  t h e  wage f u n c t i o n  w i t h  
r e s p e c t  t o  any g iven  set o f  s i g n a l s  t o  n e c e s s a r i l y  be  s t a b l e .  
The p r e f e r e n c e  f u n c t i o n  o r  l a b o r  f o r c e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  f u n c t i o n  
cou ld  change a t  any t i m e  a l t e r i n g  how agg rega t e  o u t p u t  i s  d i s t r i -  
buted.*  T h i s  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  t h e  box i n  t h e  lower r i g h t  hand s i d e  
o f  F igu re  3 can a l s o  n o t  be a c c u r a t e l y  modeled a s  p a r t  o f  a  
feedback system. 
The e x i s t e n c e  of a  promotion scheme t h a t  i s  n o t  based on 
a c q u i s i t i o n  of  human c a p i t a l  makes it d i f f i c u l t  t o  de te rmine  
e m p i r i c a l l y  t h e  r e t u r n  on e d u c a t i o n a l  inves tment .  The " c o n t r o l "  
f o r  t h e  s imp le  human c a p i t a l  model i s  a  f l a t  (Mincer)  o r  d e c l i n i n g  
(Ben-Porath, 1 9 6 7 )  income s t ream.  Th i s  paper  a rgues  t h a t  t h e  
s t r u c t u r e  o f  demand i n  t h e  l a b o r  market  a l r e a d y  g i v e s  workers a  
concave income s t ream.  Human c a p i t a l  inves tment  may add t o  t h a t  
concav i ty  b u t  i n  a  ( numer i ca l l y )  undetermined f a s h i o n .  
I n  many b u r e a u c r a t i c  jobs  it can be  argued t h a t  t h e r e  i s  
l i t t l e  human c a p i t a l  inves tment ,  s o  t h a t  most s a l a r y  i n c r e a s e s  can 
b e  modeled u s i n g  S e c t i o n  2. I n  jobs  where s a l a r y  i s  t h e  r e s u l t  o f  
*One example o f  t h i s  i n  p r a c t i c e  i s  t h e  tendency t o  r e q u i r e  h i g h e r  
and h i g h e r  c r e d e n t i a l s  f o r  jobs  t h a t  used t o  be  performed by less 
educa ted  peop le .  Workers who planned f o r  one market  f i n d  t h e y  must 
compete i n  a n o t h e r  more educa t ed  market .  A f f i r m a t i v e  a c t i o n  pro- 
grams r e p r e s e n t  p u r p o s e f u l  changes i n  t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  p r e f e r e n c e  
o r d e r i n g  t h a t  have real  consequences f o r  i n d i v i d u a l  income streams. 
a  combination of increased  p r o d u c t i v i t y  and i n s t i t u t i o n a l  advance- 
ment it would be necessary t o  s o r t  o u t  t he  two e f f e c t s  f o r  empiri- 
c a l  e s t ima t ion  of  e i t h e r  model. However these  e f f e c t s  must be 
d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  on t h e o r e t i c a l  grounds before  approaching t h e  da ta .  
The f o u r  d i s t r i b u t i o n  func t ions  a r e  s u f f i c i e n t l y  gene ra l  t h a t  
v i r t u a l l y  any earn ings  streams could be c o n s i s t e n t  w i th  s o l e l y  
i n s t i t u t i o n a l  advancement, s o  t h e  d a t a  cannot d i s c r i m i n a t e  
between product ive  and nonproductive bases  f o r  s a l a r y  increases .*  
I f  i n  f a c t  t h e  underlying s t r u c t u r a l  model were t o  be i n c o r r e c t l y  
s p e c i f i e d ,  and t h e  e n t i r e  earn ings  p r o f i l e  explained wi th  only  a  
supply and n o t  a  t r u e  reduced-form model, then understandably t h e  
empi r i ca l  r e s u l t s  w i l l  n o t  always be good, s e e  Cambell and C u r t i s  
(1975) .  
CONCLUSION 
I t  has been argued t h a t  f o r  a  l a r g e  range of  jobs ,earn ings  
a r e  n o t  determined by t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  b u t  by an i n s t i t u t i o n a l  
system t h a t  i s  n o t  respons ive  t o  marginal p r i c i n g  mechanisms. An 
a l t e r n a t i v e  explana t ion  of how ea rn ing  streams a r e  genera ted  i s  
developed using a  demand model of t h e  l abor  market. 
The theory  presented  here  i s  s t i l l  s o  gene ra l  t h a t  most any 
type of l abor  market behavior could be explained by c a r e f u l  
s e l e c t i o n  of t h e  f o u r  underlying func t ions .  Yet t h i s  model i s  
appea l ing  because it o f f e r s  a  simple,  r e a l i s t i c  foundat ion wi th in  
*Lazear (1976) a t tempts  t o  d i f f e r e n t i a t e  between wage i n c r e a s e s  
due t o  age and those due t o  experience using t h e  obse rva t ion  
t h a t  one does n o t  ga in  experience when unemployed. H i s  f i n d i n g s  
a r e  no t  i n c o n s i s t e n t  wi th  t h e  model presented here .  I n  t h e  
i n s t i t u t i o n a l  model, i f  a  worker becomes unemployed he must have 
been moved down below zero on t h e  a b i l i t y  a x i s .  A nega t ive  
c o r r e l a t i o n  between wages and unemployment is assumed. When he 
i s  r e t i r e d  because h i s  age makes him p r e f e r r e d  t o  younger, and 
u n s k i l l e d ,  workers he w i l l  be a t  a  higher  s e n i o r i t y  l e v e l  bu t  
no t  a s  high a s  i f  he  bad been employed t h e  e n t i r e  time. 
which can be  n e s t e d  t h e  more r e s t r i c t i v e  models of  human c a p i t a l  
t heo ry  and s i g n a l i n g .  There a r e  s e v e r a l  s p e c i f i c  i m p l i c a t i o n s  of  
t h i s  t heo ry  
1 .  Concave s e n i o r i t y  advancement ( e a r n i n g s )  can be expected 
o v e r  t i m e  f o r  a lmos t  a l l  workers independent  o f  i n d i v i d -  
u a l  behav ior .  I t  i s  a  mis take  t o  a s s o c i a t e  a  g iven  
e a r n i n g  s t r eam o n l y  w i th  a  worker ' s  inves tment  i n  t r a i n -  
i ng .  Demand a s  w e l l  a s  supp ly  behav io r  de t e rmines  a  
worker ' s  j ob  and income s t r eam and consequen t ly  t h e  
" r e t u r n "  on any inves tment .  
2 .  C a l c u l a t i o n  o f  bo th  p r i v a t e  and s o c i a l  r a t e  of  r e t u r n  
c a l c u l a t i o n s  a r e  o f  l i t t l e  va lue .  A worker canno t  pre-  
d i c t  e i t h e r  where h i s  inves tment  w i l l  p u t  him i n  t h e  
l a b o r  queue o r  what h i s  income s t r eam w i l l  be. The 
worker ' s  observed  income cannot  t h e n  be  viewed a s  t h e  
r e s u l t  of o p t i m a l  p lann ing .  B e l i e f  i n  a  c o n s t a n t  esti-  
mable rate of  r e t u r n  t o  inves tment  i s  i l l - f ounded .  
This  model h a s  assumed t h e  s o c i a l  r e t u r n  t o  s choo l ing  f o r  
i n s t i t u t i o n a l  employees i s  zero .  I n d i v i d u a l s  may i n v e s t  i n  
s i g n a l s  t o  g a i n  a p e r s o n a l  advantage i n  rank ing ,  b u t  i n c r e a s e d  
o u t p u t  i s  n o t  observed  from t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n  by t h e  i n t e r n a l  
re-ranking. I n  a  more r e a l i s t i c  world w i t h  bo th  c o m p e t i t i v e  and 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l  marke t s  t h e  s o c i a l  r e t u r n  t o  s choo l ing  w i l l  n o t  be  
z e r o ,  b u t  o n l y  imposs ib l e  t o  de te rmine  e m p i r i c a l l y .  
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